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Abstract
I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit common-
value uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show
that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information
collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily
small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects
information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit common-value
uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. There are some
bidders who have the option of receiving a costly signal of the unknown true value.
There are also some bidders who face a prohibitively high cost of receiving a signal.
Important work by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) shows that in a common value
setting, “large” uniform price auctions aggregate information fully. With n bidders
each demanding at most 1 unit, and k units, if both k and (n − k) become large, the
auction price converges to the true value. This is true even if only a small proportion of
bidders are informed. The equilibrium is also the unique among symmetric equilibria.
The purpose of this note is to show that so long as there are some uninformed bidders
(bidders who have a very high cost of information collection), even if there are a large
number of bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are
equilibria in which no one collects information so long as the supply is large enough.
I allow demand function bids, but the result would hold with unit demand as well,
but with the additional requirement that the number of uninformed bidders rises as
supply increases.
The rational expectations (RE) approach provides a systematic way to investigate the
informational role of prices. An unappealing feature of these models is that the traders
are naive price takers. The qualifier naive implies that an RE equilibrium is manipulable
in the sense that an agent can obtain any allocation in equilibrium by misrepresenting
his preferences. Naive price-taking by agents in RE models gives rise to certain well
known paradoxes. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that if information is costly, an
informationally efficient equilibrium cannot exist. There is a conflict between equilib-
rium prices fully revealing all relevant information, and the incentive to obtain costly
information. Once the price taking assumption is removed and the price formation
process is modeled (Milgrom (1981),Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1987),Jackson
(1991)), there is no necessary conflict between the incentive to acquire costly informa-
tion and revelation of information through prices.
The examples of uninformative equilibria here point to a different conflict – that be-
tween incentive to collect costly information, and the extent to which uninformed bid-
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ders attempt make use of the information of the informed by demanding units at high
prices, reducing information rent, and therefore the incentive to collect information.
2 THE MODEL
The total supply is normalized to 1. This is supplied in S parts. The normalization
implies that each “unit” is a fraction 1/S of the total supply, and thus each unit is a
smaller fraction of the total supply as supply increases. This serves to capture the idea
that for as the auction size gets larger, the value of each unit gets smaller.
The value of the total supply is V. Each unit is valued at V/S. The value V is a random
variable with a continuous distribution function F(·) and density function f (·) over a
support [0,V]. The distribution of V is public information.
Some bidders can obtain an informative signal about V at a cost c > 0. I assume
the standard common values scenario. Let Xi ∈ [0, 1] denote the signal potentially
received by informed bidder i, i ∈ I. Let g(Xi|V) denote the conditional density of
Xi given the common value V. Conditional on V, the random variables X1, . . . ,XNI
are independently and identically distributed. For notational convenience I define the
“signal” of a bidder who remains uninformed as φ. Thus each bidder draws a signal
from [0, 1] ∪ {φ}. A bidder with signal φ has access to only public information.
There are also some bidders who face a prohibitively high cost of information and
therefore never collect information, and only have access to public information.
Let NI > 1 be the number of potentially informed bidders, and NU > 1 be the number
of bidders who have a prohibitively high cost of information collection and remain
uninformed. Let I and U denote the sets of potentially informed and uninformed
bidders, respectively. All bidders are risk neutral.
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2.1 BIDS AND STRATEGIES
A bid is any decreasing function q(p) mapping the set of prices [0,V] to the set of
quantities {0, 1, . . . , S}. Since there are S discrete units, a bid function is a step function:
q(p) =

0 for p1 < p 6 V,
1 for p2 < p 6 p1,
...
...
S for 0 6 p 6 pS,
The following representation of a bid function is very useful. Note that the inverse of
a bid function can be derived as follows:
p(q˜) =
{
maxp{p|q(p) > q˜} if this exists,
0 otherwise.
The resulting function p(·) is the inverse demand function, and thus a bid can be writ-
ten as a vector (p1, . . . , pS), such that
p(q) =

p1 over 1 unit,
p2 over 2 units,
...
...
pS over S units,
where
V > p1 > p2 > . . . > pS > 0. (2.1)
Let Ω be the set of vectors (p1, . . . , pS) that satisfy (2.1). Then Ω ⊂ <S+ is the set of bid
functions. This is compact and convex.
A pure strategy of bidder i ∈ I has two components. First, he must decide whether to
spend c to collect information, and then decide which bid to submit. A bid by i ∈ I
is a mapping from [0, 1] ∪ {φ} to Ω. A pure strategy for i is written as (D, qi(p)(Xi)),
where D ∈ {Y,N}.
A pure strategy for uninformed bidder j, j ∈ U is simply a bid qj(p) ∈ Ω.
I analyze a simultaneous game. Each potentially informed bidder i ∈ I decideswhether
to obtain costly information and submits a bid. The decision about information acqui-
sition is private and not observed by others. Simultaneously, other bidders submit
bids.
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2.2 MARKET CLEARING PRICE AND ALLOCATION RULE
The market clearing price is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For any K 6 S, the market clearing price m(K) is given by the highest price
at which demand exceeds or equals K units. Thus
m(K) = sup
p
(
p|∑
i∈I
qi(p)(·) + ∑
j∈U
qj(p) > K
)
.
Finally, the quantity won by a particular bid needs to be specified. Suppose bidder
h ∈ I ∪U submits a demand function qh(p) specifying positive prices for k units, k 6 S.
Also, let k′ be the highest integer below k such that pk′ > pk. The winning function
qwh (p) is specified below.
qwh (p) =

k if pk > m(S),
k′ + αh(k− k′) if pk = m(S),
0 otherwise,
where1
αh =
k
∑
i∈I
qi(m(S))(·) + ∑
j∈U
qj(m(S))
.
1If αh(k− k′) is not an integer the bidder is allocated the greatest positive integer (including 0) less
than this. The remainder is allocated randomly according to proportional probabilities.
5
3 UNINFORMATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
An equilibrium is uninformative if no bidder spends c to collect information.
3.1 AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH ZERO PAYOFF FOR ALL BIDDERS
Consider Ki > 0 for all i ∈ I and Kj > 0 for all j ∈ U such that ∑i∈I Ki = KI and
∑j∈U Kj = S− KI − `, where ` > 1. Now consider the following profile of strategies.
1. For all i ∈ I, bidder i chooses not to collect information and submits the following
bid: p1 = . . . = pKi = V, and pKi+1 = . . . = pS = EV.
2. Similarly, for all j ∈ U bidder j submits the following bid: p1 = . . . = pKj = V,
and pKj+1 = . . . = pS = EV.
The strategy of each bidder is to demand some units at price V, and demand all avail-
able units at the price EV. Given the above strategy profile, the market clears at EV
and each bidder earns a zero payoff. I show below that this strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium for large enough S.
Proposition 1. For any given ` > 1 and c > 0, there exists S∗ such that for any S > S∗ the
strategy profile above is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let S∗ be given by the following:(
maxi∈I Ki + `
S∗
)
E(V|V > EV) = c. (3.1)
First, let us see if any i ∈ I has a profitable deviation to information collection. Note
that even if any such bidder reduces demand to zero units, the market clearing price is
unaffected and stays at EV. Therefore, the only way information can benefit a bidder is
that for high enough signals he could demand an additional ` units at a price slightly
higher than EV and earn a positive payoff. Therefore an upper bound to the payoff of
bidder i ∈ I from information collection is given by (Ki + `
S
)E(V|V > EV). It is easy
to see from equation (3.1) that for S > S∗ the payoff from collecting information is less
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than the cost c. Therefore not collecting information is a best response for each bidder
i ∈ I.
From the argument above, we know that given the strategy profile, all bidders must
be uninformed. Now let us see whether the bid submitted by any bidder is a best
response. Any bidder h ∈ I ∪U, by demanding either fewer units at the price V or
by reducing some of the prices (p1, . . . , pKh) to any other price greater than or equal
to EV cannot change the market clearing price. Also by changing some of the prices
(p1, . . . , pKh) to any price below EV the bidder wins fewer units, but the overall payoff
remains zero. Finally, if any such bidder demands more than Kh units at some prices
greater than or equal to EV, either this does not affect the market clearing price (if the
total demand at prices strictly above EV is still lower than S), in which case the payoff
is still zero, or this leads to market clearing at some price strictly above EV in which
case payoff is strictly negative. Thus the strategy of each bidder is a best response. This
completes the proof.‖
3.2 DISCRETE PRICES: AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH POSITIVE PAYOFFS FOR ALL BIDDERS
In the example above, the market clearing price cannot be any lower than EV. Other-
wise, it is always possible for any bidder to benefit by raising the price by a very small
amount which increases winning quantity discretely. If price changes in discrete units,
another factor starts to have a bite. It is possible to win all marginal units (` units in
the example above) by posting a higher price, but this also raises the price paid on all
infra-marginal units won by the bidder (Kh for h ∈ I ∪U in the above example). Using
this effect, it is possible to sustain a price lower than EV in equilibrium, earning each
bidder a strictly positive payoff.
Suppose price bids must be in units of ∆. Let n be a positive integer such that n∆ = V.
Therefore any m∆ with m 6 n is a feasible price.
Let p˜ < EV be a feasible price such that
EV − p˜ 6 2∆. (3.2)
I assume that ∆ is not too large so that the above condition does hold for some p˜ < EV.
Let S > NI + NU. Consider Ki > 0 for all i ∈ I and Kj > 0 for all j ∈ U be such
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that ∑i∈I Ki = KI > NI and ∑j∈U Kj = S− KI − 1. The difference with the previous
example is that Ki and Kj are now all strictly positive, and ` is set to 1.
Now consider the following profile of strategies.
1. For all i ∈ I, bidder i chooses not to collect information and submits the following
bid: p1 = . . . = pKi = V, and pKi+1 = . . . = pS = p˜.
2. Similarly, for all j ∈ U bidder j submits the following bid: p1 = . . . = pKj = V,
and pKj+1 = . . . = pS = p˜.
The following result shows that for large enough S, the above strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Given any c > 0, and any p˜ satisfying (3.2), there exists S∗ such that for any
S > S∗ the strategy profile above is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let S∗ be such that
(
maxi∈I Ki + 1
S∗
)
E(V|V > p˜) = c. The rest of the proof
is exactly like the previous proof, the only extra factor is to check whether any bidder
has an incentive to raise the price on the marginal unit. The expected payoff of bidder
h ∈ I ∪ U under the given strategies is given by pih =
(
Kh +
1
NI + NU
)
(EV − p˜).
The fraction in the first expression arises from the fact that each bidder demands S
units at the price p˜ and therefore the marginal unit is allocated to any bidder with
probability of 1/(NI + NU) . Next, the payoff from raising the price on the marginal
unit is pih = (Kh + 1) (EV − p˜− ∆). Equilibrium requires pih > pih, which implies
(EV − p˜)
(
NI + NU − 1
NI + NU
)
6 (Kh + 1)∆.
But (3.2) is sufficient for this to hold.‖
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